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Abstract
Ranked choice voting (RCV) is experiencing a surge of interest in the United States, highlighted by its 2018 use for
Congressional elections in Maine, the first application of a ranked ballot for national‐level elections in American history.
A century ago, the same systemwas introduced in another federal, two‐party continental‐sized democracy: Australia. RCV’s
utility as a solution to inter‐party coordination problems helps to explain its appeal in both countries, underscoring the
potential benefits of a comparative analytical approach. This article examines this history of adoption and then turns to a
comparison of recent RCV elections in Maine with state elections in New SouthWales and Queensland, the two Australian
stateswhich share the same formof RCV as that used in the United States. This comparison shows how candidate and party
endorsements influence voters’ rankings and can, over time, promote reciprocal exchanges between parties and broader
systemic support for RCV. Such cross‐partisan support helps explain the stability of RCV in Australia, with implications for
the system’s prospects in the United States.
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1. Introduction
Ranked choice voting (RCV) is experiencing a surge
of interest in the United States. Advocated as a
means of delivering more majority‐supported victors
and addressing broader problems of polarization, inci‐
vility and vote‐splitting under plurality rules, RCV has
been adopted for mayoral and other local elections in
major United States cities such as San Francisco, Oakland,
Minneapolis, and Santa Fe.Most importantly for this arti‐
cle, after repeated initiative ballots and legal challenges,
was RCV’s adoption for United States Congressional elec‐
tions in Maine, and its first use at the November 2018
mid‐terms.
This historic first use of a ranked ballot for United
States national elections invites comparison with other
jurisdictions using RCV in similar partisan, large‐scale
contests. A particularly relevant comparative case is
Australia—another continental‐sized federal two‐party
democracy that has used RCV for state and national
elections for over a century. Australia’s extended use
of RCV in both single‐member majoritarian (in the fed‐
eral House of Representatives and most state lower
houses) and multi‐member proportional (in the Senate
and most state upper houses) forms has seen Australian
politics develop distinctive adaptations to ‘preferential
voting,’ as RCV is known locally. As this article will show,
some of these are directly relevant to the United States,
while others are unlikely to be part of the American
RCV experience.
Key in both countries is how parties and candidates
respond to the presence of a ranked ballot in terms of
their campaign strategy. This article examines the pro‐
cess by which parties and candidates seek and recip‐
rocally offer secondary rankings in their quest for elec‐
toral victory. In Australia, such ‘preference swapping’
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arrangements are usually made between parties which
share some degree of ideological affinity, and communi‐
cated to voters via another distinctive Australian adapta‐
tion to RCV: ‘how‐to‐vote’ cards that detail each party’s
suggested ordering of rankings amongst all candidates
standing for a seat. These are distributed outside polling
booths by party operatives, seeking to ensure prospec‐
tive voters cast a valid vote and follow the party’s
preference‐swapping deals as closely as possible. By con‐
trast, in the more recent and localized American use of
RCV to date, such prompts and voter cues aremore likely
to be communicated at candidate debates or through
the media.
How closely voters follow their favoured party’s rank‐
ing cues can determine not just who wins and loses
a seat, but also the extent to which RCV encourages
broader campaign civility, moderation and collaboration
(Donovan, Tolbert, & Gracey, 2016; Reilly, 2001). It is
thus a key indicator of RCV’s effectiveness as a politi‐
cal reform. This article examines this issue by comparing
Maine with the two Australian states, New South Wales
and Queensland, which share the same form of RCV.
Candidates, parties and affiliated groups all influence
voters’ use of rankings. As I will show, the willingness
of parties and candidates to advocate—or withhold—
endorsements of secondary rankings for rivals can deter‐
mine the outcomes of closely‐fought contests such as
Maine’s 2nd Congressional District RCV election in 2018,
and similar races which feature multiple candidates who
share overlapping policy platforms and ideology.
2. Some Background
By requiring winners to obtain an absolute majority of
the vote (either outright or after the distribution of pref‐
erences), RCV offers different routes to victory than plu‐
rality elections. While in practice most RCV contests are
won by the same candidate who leads in the first‐choice
count, this is not always the case. At Australia’s 2016 fed‐
eral election, for instance, 11% of all seats were won by
candidates who were not the first‐round plurality leader,
while (as discussed later in this article) Maine’s first
RCV election also saw such a ‘leap‐frog’ (Maloy, 2019)
or ‘come‐from‐behind’ (Reilly & Stewart, 2021) result.
In such cases, RCV advantages candidates who can gar‐
ner not only a competitive first‐choice vote but also a
healthy flow of second‐choice votes from supporters of
other candidates. This encourages broader pre‐election
appeals and party collaboration than would occur under
otherwise‐identical plurality voting procedures.
I have argued elsewhere that Australia’s extensive
and extended use of RCV is one reason that elec‐
toral competition there has remained largely centrist
(Reilly, 2001, 2016, 2018), in contrast to the United
States. Despite the different contexts, the fundamentals
of single‐member RCV are identical in both countries:
Voters provide an ordinal ranking of candidates standing,
and any candidate whowins an absolutemajority of first‐
choice votes is elected immediately. If no candidate has
an outright majority, the candidate with the lowest num‐
ber of first‐choice votes is eliminated from the count and
their ballots transferred according to each voter’s second
(and, if necessary, later) rankings. This process continues
until one candidate has gained a majority of votes left in
the count, and is elected.
However, there are also some important differ‐
ences between American and Australian practice. Most
Australian jurisdictions compel voters to express a rank‐
ing for all candidates standing. Along with Australia’s
other forms of electoral compulsion—compulsory enroll‐
ment and compulsory voting—this ‘compulsory prefer‐
ential’ formof RCV largely removes fromparties the need
to get out the vote, and ensures a much more reliable
flow of preferences from minor parties back to one of
the two major parties (Reilly & Maley, 2000).
By contrast, in San Francisco and some other United
States RCV elections, electors are limited to a maximum
of three preferences due to the configuration of voting
machines, with the ballot based on machine‐readable
selections by column rather than the hand‐written
numerical rankings used in Australia. This enables ‘over‐
votes’ to be identified and corrected before they are
lodged, making for much lower levels of invalid votes
than at Australian elections, where numbering errors,
blank ballots and protest votes are all a feature of the
compulsory system (Kimball & Anthony, 2017).
Figure 1 illustrates these different ballot designs from
three different RCV elections: the first from Maine, the
second from a compulsory preferential Australian fed‐
eral election, and the third from an optional preferen‐
tial New South Wales state election. Maine’s voters are
instructed to rank a first choice, a second choice “and
so on… continue to rank as many or as few candidates
as you like.” In New South Wales, the instructions are
to number a first choice, with the rider that “you can
show more choices, if you want to, by writing numbers
in the other squares.” By contrast, at Australian federal
elections, voters are told explicitly to “number every box
to make your vote count.”
These differences reflect the history of RCV’s adop‐
tion in each case. Australia borrowed liberally from
the United States when choosing its national governing
institutions at federation in 1901: dividing and sharing
sovereignty between national and state governments via
federalism, with a bicameral elected legislature featuring
a popular House of Representatives and a Senate to rep‐
resent State interests, a written constitution interpreted
by the highest court in the land, and so on. But in contrast
to the American experience, in Australia the drawbacks
of plurality elections were highlighted in early constitu‐
tional debates and were soon manifested in elections to
thenew federal and state assemblies in the early decades
of the 20th century.
In 1907, the state of Western Australia became
the first jurisdiction to adopt RCV as a means to save
the costs of a runoff election, promote more civic
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Figure 1. Three RCV ballot papers fromMaine (Congressional), Australia (federal‐level), and New SouthWales (state‐level).
engagement in the electoral process, and enable major‐
ity rather than plurality victors, as well as sparing
Australian parties the need to run primary elections
(Phillips, 2008, p. 44). However, the first state election
held under RCV in 1908 was only partially successful in
meeting these aims, as parties continued to present mul‐
tiple candidates and many voters expressed only a first
choice, making rankings ineffective (being counted in
only eight of the 50 electorates, and changing the results
in none). This undermined the aggregation potential of
preferential voting, and made its operation in practice
analogous to a plurality race.
In the United States, similar plurality‐like outcomes
were used to justify the repeal of RCV after its first wave
of use in the early part of the 20th century. For instance,
RCV rules for party primaries in Maryland, Indiana and
Florida were all repealed in the 1930s, after successive
elections in which relatively few voters expressed pref‐
erences beyond the first, delivering results indistinguish‐
able from a plurality contest (Hughes & Santucci, 2017).
In Australia, by contrast, the widespread non‐use of pref‐
erences offered legislators the opportunity tomake rank‐
ings mandatory, an idea that had been raised in ear‐
lier constitutional debates and presented political advan‐
tages for the dominant conservative side of politics in
ensuring a degree of inter‐party coordination. In 1911,
before its second RCV election, Western Australia there‐
fore made it compulsory for voters to express rankings
for all candidates in order to effect a valid vote. Those
who ranked only one or some candidates had their vote
invalidated in most cases.
This change, little discussed at the time, proved to be
highly consequential and was soon replicated by other
states and the federal government. With party systems
in an embryonic stage and the consequence of prefer‐
ence flows difficult to predict, the benefits of ensuring
that these occurred by law if not voter choice proved
particularly attractive to parties on the conservative side
of politics, whose vote was often split between multi‐
ple rural and urban parties. Conservative interest in RCV
peaked after a 1918 by‐election was won by Labor with
35% of the vote despite the three non‐Labor candidates
collectively mustering 65%. The introduction of RCVwith
compulsory preference marking for national elections
soon after sought to address these recurring coordina‐
tion problems by allowing conservative urban and rural
parties to cooperate, aggregating their votes to build
majority victories over a plurality‐leading Labor candi‐
date (Graham, 1962).
On the face of it, this experience has some simi‐
larities with the more recent and episodic introduction
of RCV for primary and city elections in the United
States, where the emergence of third parties alongside
ruling‐party splits oftenmade new reformalliances possi‐
ble (Santucci, 2017). Upon closer examination, however,
there are important differences. In Australia, with no pri‐
mary elections (local branches pick candidates, but can
be over‐ruled by the national party executive), RCV was
usually seen as a desirable end‐point in itself, while in the
United States it has often been seen as a stepping‐stone
towards broader reforms such as proportional represen‐
tation (Amy, 2002; Drutman, 2019; Richie, 2004). Only in
recent years, with RCV emerging as a viable reform for
Congressional elections, have the virtues of majoritarian
aggregation been championed (Diamond, 2017).
A possibly uncomfortable lesson for United States
reformers from the Australian experience is that single‐
member RCV has never led to proportional represen‐
tation. Instead, once single‐member district elections
changed from plurality to RCV, they stayed there. Indeed,
once adopted federally, it took only a few decades
for RCV to spread across the continent—from Western
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Australia and Victoria (which had adopted the system in
1916) and then on to New South Wales (1928), South
Australia (1936) and eventually Queensland (1962).
By the early 1960s, single‐member RCV was the law of
the land for all lower houses save Tasmania, which uses
a proportional form of RCV (Farrell & McAllister, 2006).
Key to this relatively smooth progression and adop‐
tion of RCV was the electoral interests of conservative
parties, who found that compulsory preferential voting
delivered a reliable flow of preferences from smaller par‐
ties to their right. By contrast, the Labor Party found
themselves at an electoral disadvantage, and for many
years sought to return to plurality voting or introduce
optional preferences. By the 1980s, however, this began
to change, as the rise of post‐material and environmen‐
tal politics saw Labor start to benefit from increasing
flows of preferences from parties to their left, such as
theAustralianDemocrats and later theAustralianGreens.
As Labor became the beneficiary of a system it had
long opposed, it also became a strong supporter of com‐
pulsory rankings, from which it now greatly benefits.
As Peter Brent (2018) has detailed, this structural advan‐
tage has been increasing for decades, with Labor increas‐
ingly advantaged by preference transfers compared to
the centre‐right Coalition (i.e., the Liberal and National
Parties in a long‐term alliance; see Figure 2).
Despite this partisan imbalance, RCV has to date
retained the support of all the main Australian parties,
albeit for different reasons. While the federal Coalition
has over time become a net loser from RCV in electoral
terms, they have so far continued to support the sys‐
tem in part because it helps maintain their long‐standing
coalition arrangement. In so‐called ‘three‐corner’ con‐
tests in which National, Liberal and Labor candidates as
well as minor parties and independents stand, compul‐
sory RCV helps avoid vote‐splitting between different
parties and affiliated groups from the political right, a
concern today just as it was a century ago. Minor parties
of the political left such as the Australian Greens also sup‐
port RCV, seeing it as ameans for them towield influence
on the major parties.
By lessening uncertainty for the major parties over
the quantity and direction of rankings, compulsory pref‐
erential RCV also makes elections more predictable and
reinforces the status quo. Recommendations from schol‐
ars to revert to optional preferential voting, as used
in the United States and indeed all cases of RCV out‐
side Australia, have to date attracted little enthusiasm
(Farrell & McAllister, 2006, p. 179; Reilly & Maley, 2000,
pp. 37–58). However, in late 2020, a Coalition‐dominated
parliamentary committee called for optional preferential
voting to be introduced for future federal elections, sig‐
nalling a potential change in this long‐standing consen‐
sus (Reilly & Stewart, 2021).
By making lower house electoral politics a contest
for the middle ground, RCV in Australia has also served
as a prophylactic against political extremism. At times,
the two major parties have even swapped preferences
with each other to eliminate perceived systemic threats,
such as the emergence of the far‐right One Nation
party in the late 1990s (Reilly, 2001, pp. 53–54). This
stands in sharp contrast to the situation in the United
States today, where voters often face polarized choices
at both primary and general elections under plurality
rules, forced to choose between relatively extreme can‐
didates (Bartels, 2016), and where the two main par‐
ties face perverse incentives towards negative campaign‐
ing and other zero‐sum strategies. By introducing some
elements of a positive‐sum game—whereby votes for
a rival can still flow back to your party via transfers—
RCV offers a potential circuit‐breaker to this ‘doom loop’
(Drutman, 2019).
Supporting this contention, studies of RCV elec‐
tions in San Francisco, Oakland, Minneapolis and other
American cities have mostly affirmed that RCV elections
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Figure 2.Major parties’ gains from preferences at federal elections (%), 1946–2016. Source: Brent (2018).
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contests held under plurality rules (Donovan et al., 2016).
Opinion polls have also presented significant confirm‐
ing evidence that RCV increases electoral moderation
when compared to control cases using plurality vot‐
ing (Fairvote, 2015). Despite this, court challenges and
repeal movements remain a feature of RCV in the United
States, even as burgeoning reform movements push for
the system’s nationwide adoption. As Santucci (2018,
p. 4) notes:
RCV in the U.S. has been repeal‐prone. Recent enact‐
ments in Pierce County (WA) and Burlington (VT),
for example, lasted just a few years each. Voters
in Ann Arbor (MI) used RCV for only one election,
in 1975….Passing RCV today far from guarantees
its permanence.
The varying treatment of rankings—optional versus
compulsory—offers one potential explanation for the rel‐
ative stability of RCV in Australia compared to the United
States. By ensuring a reliable flow of rankings from sup‐
porters of smaller parties to larger ones, Australia’s sys‐
tem of mandatory rankings has seen most parties grow
to support RCV, with themajors seeking to harvestminor
party preferences, and theminors seeing it as ameans to
improve their influence onmajor parties. Both are under‐
pinned by ‘cross‐house’ preference deals, in which par‐
ties’ varying focus on lower and upper houses creates
an opportunity for arbitrage between the two (Sharman,
Sayers, & Miragliotta, 2002). As a result, RCV retains
broad political support in Australia, to the point where
alternatives are seldom considered. In the United States,
by contrast, opponents of RCV have been able to organ‐
ise resistance based not just on political interest, but also
by making claims about RCV’s complexity, administrative
efficiency, and constitutional fealty.
The historic first‐use of RCV for national elections in
Maine in 2018, discussed below, presented a key test
case for many of these claims. As a full‐blooded partisan
contest, it also invites direct comparison with the Aus‐
tralian experience. But in order to compare like with like,
such a comparison needs to be with cases of optional
rather than compulsory rankings. Two Australian states,
New SouthWales and Queensland, use (or in the case of
Queensland, used) such a system, where the decision to
express secondary and later preferences is left up to the
voter rather than compelled in electoral law. Their mass‐
level partisan elections to state legislatures also provide
a much better framework for comparison with Maine
than the mostly non‐partisan city‐level applications of
RCV elsewhere in the United States.
The remainder of this article therefore compares the
relationship between party cues and voter rankings from
2015 elections in both Australian states with Maine in
2018. Appeals for secondary preferences made a dif‐
ference to electoral outcomes in all cases—changing
the strategic incentives for candidates compared to a
plurality contest, and the likely results, in a number
of cases. However, this comparison also highlights the
broader challenges of behavioral adaptation by voters
and politicians facing a new and more complex voting
system—as was the case in Maine in 2018—and the
need for intra‐party coordination in tight races involving
both major and minor parties, as well as independents,
under RCV.
3. Parties and Preferences at Recent Australian State
Elections
As noted earlier, Australian parties typically distribute
‘how to vote’ pamphlets outside polling places to con‐
vey to intending voters a preferred preference ordering
amongst the candidates standing. Examination of the
relationship between such party cues and the actual
rankingsmade by voters can quantify the extent towhich
voter behavior can be steered by such suggestions. Such
appeals are usually made on the basis of reciprocity—
that is, an expectation that an offer by one party to
recommend their supporters provide lower‐order rank‐
ings for a rival candidate will see that party or candi‐
date do likewisewith their own voters. In Australia, these
‘preference‐swapping’ deals rely on a combination of ide‐
ological affinity between parties and naked political cal‐
culation, and are typically negotiated by party secretaries
rather than individual candidates.
Ballot paper surveys conducted in 2015 at state elec‐
tions in both New South Wales and Queensland (Green,
2018) show how such deals influence voters’ choice of
whether and who to rank under RCV. While overall most
voters followed the ‘how‐to‐vote’ recommendations of
their favored party, there was considerable partisan vari‐
ation. In New South Wales, for instance, the proportion
of single rankings by Labor voters reached 72% in the
21 electorates where this strategy was recommended
by the Labor Party’s campaign material, and fell sharply
when Labor how‐to‐vote cards instead suggested a par‐
tial or full preference recommendations. The rate of both
full and partial preferencing doubled in those electorates
where this was recommended, compared to suggestions
that a single preference only be marked. For instance,
recommendations that Labor voters give their second
preference to a Greens candidate in some seats resulted
in a 20% increase in preference flows compared to the
control cases of no recommendation.
A similar pattern was evident amongst Greens vot‐
ers. In seats where the Greens recommended a single ‘1’
vote for their candidate only, the rate of exhausted pref‐
erences was 53% and the flow of second preferences to
Labor 31%. Where the Greens recommended a second
preference for a third party, the flows were 28% to such
third parties and 24% to Labor. Where the second pref‐
erence recommendation was for Labor, its share lifted to
38%. Averaged across all electorates, the willingness of
Greens voters to express a second preference increased
by 10% simply as a result of this being suggested on their
‘how‐to‐vote’ cards.
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These patternswere largely replicated in a similar bal‐
lot paper survey conducted at what was the last optional
preferential election in Queensland, also held in 2015.
There, where the Greens recommended a second pref‐
erence for a third party, the flows were 43% exhausted,
28% to that third party, and 24% to Labor. Where the
second preference recommendationwas for Labor, flows
to Labor jumped to 38%. Not only did Greens voters
give second preferences at a much higher rate when
they were asked to than when they were not, but an
additional 15% of available preferences went to Labor
candidates when this was suggested by the Greens to
their supporters.
The varying approaches to such party recommenda‐
tions appears to hinge on the marginality of the seat
concerned. The tighter the contest, the more likely it
is that parties will seek and voters offer preferences to
rival but politically cognate or aligned candidates, and
hence (in these examples) the stronger the coordination
between Labor and Green parties and their preference
flows. It was in this way—by asking for and receiving
the preferences of Greens voters—that Labor won three
seats from second place on preferences at the 2015 NSW
election (Green, 2015).
In sum, preference endorsementsmatter in RCV elec‐
tions, and they particularly matter in close contests.
Under conditions of electoral uncertainty, where sec‐
ondary preferences may be the difference between vic‐
tory and defeat, it makes sense as an a priori electoral
strategy to signal this willingness to one’s supporters, if
only for the potential opportunity to receive preference
flows from rivals in return.
4. Parties and Preferences in Maine’s Second
Congressional District 2018
The Australian experience is pertinent to Maine’s 2018
and 2020 RCV elections—especially the 2018 2nd
Congressional District race, the only one of the state’s
RCV contests that has so far gone to preferences (as did
the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primaries). All other
RCV races to date have been won by absolute majorities
in the first round—resulting in the re‐election of incum‐
bent Senators Angus King (I) in 2018 and Susan Collins
(R) in 2020, incumbent 1st District Representative Chellie
Pingree (D) in both years, and incumbent 2nd District
Representative Jared Golden (D) in 2020.
The 2018 contest for Maine’s 2nd Congressional
District was another story. The first round of count‐
ing produced no majority victor, with just 2,171 first‐
ranked votes separating the incumbent, Republican
Bruce Poliquin (46.3%) from Democrat challenger Jared
Golden (45.6%), with two independents splitting the
remaining 8% of the vote between them. Winning an
RCV election in such circumstances depends not just
on having a strong first‐preference vote, but on gaining
transfers from excluded candidates. However, the can‐
didates adopted very different strategies in this regard.
At an October 2018 candidate debate in the lead‐up to
polling day, Golden and the two independents all pub‐
licly pledged that they would preference each other—
thereby signalling to their supporters to do likewise.
Republican incumbent Poliquin, by contrast, spurned the
idea of giving or asking for any second or third choice
votes. This was a folly, as second preference votes in such
a close race could (and as it turned out, did) provide the
margin of victory.
Post‐election ballot analysis by Alvarez‐Rivera (2018)
showed that, as in Australia, most voters in the 2nd
District followed their chosen party’s signalling. About
two‐thirds of Republican voters cast a single ranking for
Poliquin only, as he had effectively suggested, while for
Democrats this pattern was reversed, with over 60% of
Golden voters ranking at least one other candidate—
and even higher preferencing rates by supporters of
the two independents in the race, Tiffany Bond (73%)
and William Hoar (69%). Consequently, in the second
round of counting Golden received over twice as many
preferences from these two excluded candidates as did
Poliquin—45%, compared to 20.5%—with a further 34%
expressing no preference between the two major party
candidates, and thus exhausting. This difference effec‐
tively determined the final result, a come‐from‐behind
win for Golden with a margin of just under 3,000 votes
after the batch elimination of Bond and Hoar.
Poliquin’s dismissal of the logic of RCV saw him
become the district’s first incumbent to lose re‐election
in more than a century. Having earlier claimed that the
new system was unconstitutional, Poliquin filed a law‐
suit to stop the Secretary of State’s tabulation of ballots
before a winner could be announced. Poliquin lost this
case and then appealed to the First Circuit to halt the
certification and stop Golden from being seated. After
Poliquinwas unable to prevent Golden from taking office,
hewithdrewhis appeal. Once all lawsuits were dismissed
and the count was completed, Golden was declared the
winner with a 50.62% majority. At the final certifica‐
tion of results, outgoing Governor Paul LePage scrawled
“stolen election” on the official papers (Fried & Glover,
2018), in reference to Golden’s come‐from‐behind vic‐
tory. But such ‘leap‐frog’ results are a feature, not a bug,
of RCV, which can penalise polarizing candidates “with a
sizeable core of loyal supporters but little appeal beyond
them” (Maloy, 2019, p. 115).
The Australian comparison strongly suggests that
by ignoring the strategic imperatives inherent in RCV,
and recommending a single vote only with no rank‐
ings,Maine’s Republican Party effectively deprived them‐
selves of the potential benefits of receiving reciprocal
preference flows from excluded candidates. This may
have made sense as a broad statement of opposition to
RCV, but it was a self‐defeating strategy in the 2018 2nd
Congressional District race, which was known ahead of
time to be a close contest. In safe seats where a can‐
didate feels assured of winning, they have less incen‐
tive to reach out for second and later rankings. In tight
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contests, by contrast, every vote counts, and preferences
from other candidates’ supporters could be the margin
between victory and defeat.
What both the comparative evidence from rele‐
vant Australian elections and the particulars of Maine’s
2nd Congressional District race suggest is that had
Republicans appealed for such second‐choice votes, the
result may well have been different. Either of the two
eliminated independents received sufficient first‐choice
votes to make this a viable strategy. Even the lowest
placed independent candidate, William Hoar, who ran
on a rural‐focussed platform, received 6,875 votes, and
could have been a viable candidate for such an appeal.
As it was, the total number of exhausted votes (7,820)
weremore than twice themargin of victory.WhileMaloy
(2019, p. 115) suggests that “political professionals do
not have to experience a leap‐frog defeat before they can
grasp that the system makes it possible, and they tailor
their approach to voters accordingly,” this did not seem
to occur to Maine’s Republican Party operatives in 2018.
This unwillingness to adapt to the strategic logic of
RCV was not the only reason for the outcome, of course.
There were other factors at play: the falling popularity
of the Republican candidate and indeed of the party
brand in Maine, and counterfactuals such as how many
votes Poliquin would have lost had he chosen to reach
out to other candidates in this way (presumably some
Republican voters would have been put off by such an
approach). Nonetheless, with an eventual margin of just
3,809 votes, the decision by Poliquin and the Republican
Party leadership to explicitly reject the idea of either giv‐
ing or receiving second and later rankings was a flawed
political strategy that resulted in the loss of a potentially
winnable seat.
This reflected in part a broader opposition to the
system—Maine’s Republicans had opposed the intro‐
duction of RCV from the beginning, when reformers
targeted state assembly and gubernatorial elections
after repeated split‐vote victories by Republican Paul
LePage. Ideological opposition to RCV amongst some
Republicans reflected broader partisan polarization and
the battle over the system’s adoption at the state level.
But effecting a majority choice in a multi‐candidate race
under RCV entails a willingness to use rankings, and the
divergent partisan responses to so doing appears to have
been the difference between winning and losingMaine’s
2018 2nd Congressional District. As Tiffany Bond, one of
the two independent candidates whose voters’ rankings
ultimately determined the outcome, put it at the final
candidate’s debate: “You’d be foolish not to rank” (Starrs
& Taylor, 2018).
5. Conclusion
A key message for Maine and other users of RCV in
the United States from the century‐long Australian expe‐
rience is that rankings matter, and that party recom‐
mendations can greatly affect how voters choose to
express them. Particularly in close contests, it is ratio‐
nal to campaign for and reciprocally offer second prefer‐
ences. However, this assumes an adaptive capacity to a
new electoral system which may not always be present.
What light can the comparative evidence from
Australia shed on this process? First, parties can use rank‐
ings to solve coordination problems. In recent decades
the left side of Australian politics has been more con‐
gested and thus requires greater coordination on pref‐
erences than the right. As a result, there is more
preference‐swapping activity between parties of the left
and centre‐left than on the right. This is compounded
by the reality that conservative and single‐issue voters
in Australia are more likely truncate their rankings, while
younger voters for progressive parties aremorewilling to
express a range of preferences, but less likely to directly
follow party instructions (Green, 2018). Third, and per‐
haps most importantly, we know that Australian parties
and candidates strike deals to give and receive prefer‐
encesmore inmarginal seats.When a race is tight, office‐
seeking candidates have a prospective incentive to make
such deals before an election if they think it may bene‐
fit their prospects, regardless of whether it actually does
in practice.
Another conclusion is the importance of communi‐
cating such deals to voters. In Australia, secondary rank‐
ings under RCV are driven by reciprocal signals that
each party gives to their supporters. Communicating
these deals to voters explicitly, via campaign mate‐
rial, markedly increases their potence. In the Australian
state elections whose electoral system most resembles
American RCV, preference flows between aligned Green
and Labor candidates increased by between 10% and
20% in seats when recommended by the parties them‐
selves. In close races, this can often be the difference
between victory and defeat. Given the similarity of the
two‐party systems and broader social contexts, we could
expect similar relationships to evolve over time in par‐
tisan RCV elections in the United States, with indepen‐
dents and smaller parties on the left sending preferences
to Democrats and those on the right to Republicans.
However, as this article has highlighted, there are
also systemic differences that are likely to limit the extent
to which RCV in the United States tracks the Australian
experience. Without equivalent side‐benefits to those
received by themajor Australian parties in terms of coali‐
tion management or inter‐party coordination, there is at
present less incentive for the Democrat and Republican
parties to champion RCV reforms for their political pay‐
offs. American proponents have thus had to focus on
broader systemic benefits such as RCV’s ameliorative
impacts on political polarization and campaign civility
when making the case for reform. This is a much harder
sell than the naked electoral benefits that accrue to
Australia’s major political parties from compulsory rank‐
ings at federal elections.
Such compulsion is absent both philosophically and
in practice to American politics, making the kind of
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cross‐partisan commitment to RCV seen in Australia less
likely to develop in the United States. The Australian
experience does suggest that RCV offers a plausible
means to address polarisation and other pathologies,
and as such represents an achievable reform to plural‐
ity voting which can have far‐reaching consequences.
However, the distinctive Australian proclivity for compul‐
sion, in both preference marking and voter attendance,
is unlikely to be part of the American RCV experience.
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